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allow water dependent uses of the parcel. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of the United States.
ElaineSoltis

United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the
defendant criminally liable for violating and conspiring to violate the
Clean Water Act and other state and local laws by dumping industrial
waste from his business into storm and sewer drains).
In September 1997, a grand jury indicted the defendant, Thomas
Iverson for violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the Washington
Administrative Code ('"AC"), and the City of Olympia's Municipal
Code. The prosecution charged Iverson with both violating and
conspiring to violate these laws between 1992 and 1995.
The
indictments arose out of illegal disposal of industrial waste from
Iverson's business, CH20,Inc. ("CH20").
Iverson was the company's founder and served as the president and
chairman of the board. The company blended chemicals to create
numerous products, including acid cleaners and heavy-duty alkaline
compounds. The company shipped the blended chemicals to its
customers in drums, and asked the customers to return the drums
when finished. When the drums were returned, they were often not
cleaned properly and contained a chemical residue which had to be
removed before the drum was used again.
To remove the residue, CH20 instituted a drum-cleaning
operation, which generated wastewater. On several occasions, the
defendant asked the local sewer authority if it would accept the
wastewater. However, because the metal content of the wastewater was
so high, the sewer authority refused to accept it.
Subsequently, the defendant discharged the wastewater, and
ordered his employees to discharge the wastewater, either on the
industrial plant's property, through a sewer drain at an apartment
complex the defendant owned, or through a sewer drain at the
defendant's home. He continued these discharges for about eight
years until he hired someone to dispose of the wastewater properly.
CH20 either paid a waste disposal company to dispose of the
wastewater, or shipped the drums to a professional outside contractor
for cleaning. However, these procedures cost the company thousands
of dollars each month and Iverson discontinued this program four
years later.
Shortly thereafter, Iverson bought a warehouse in Olympia and
restarted its drum-cleaning operation at the warehouse and disposed
of its wastewater through the municipal sewer. Iverson did not obtain
a permit to make these discharges. Iverson continued this method of
wastewater disposal for three years, until CH20 learned it was under
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investigation for illegal discharges of pollutants into the sewer.
The defendant had a jury trial, where they found him guilty on all
counts. The district court sentenced Iverson to one year in custody,
three years of supervised release, and a $75,000 fine. Iverson appealed
his conviction. Iverson's primary arguments were that (1) the CWA,
the WAC, and the Olympia Code, when read together, allowed his
discharges; (2) the statutes were unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the
trial court erred in formulating its "responsible corporate officer" jury
instruction. All of Iverson's claims of error relied on the premise that
the WAC and the Olympia Code allowed discharges of industrial waste
that did not affect the water. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed.
For the first issue, the defendant argued that the Olympia Code
defines "pollutant" based on the effect of the discharge. However, the
code also expressly provides that if state standards are more stringent,
then state law applies under the Olympia Code itself. Iverson argued
that state law also measures discharges based on their effect on the
water. However, the WAC lists certain discharges as always prohibited,
including a discharge into municipal sewage of substances prohibited
by the Clean Water Act. The CWA defines "pollutant" to include any
industrial waste discharged into water. Additionally, the CWA requires
publicly owned treatment works ("POTW") to create their own
regulatory programs. Authorities deem those local regulations as
pretreatment standards under the CWA. When all the CWA provisions
are read together, the CWA prohibits the discharge of any trucked or
hauled industrial waste, regardless of the effect on water, except at
discharge points designated by the POTW. The court held that the
CWA, the WAC, and the Olympia Code prohibited the discharge of
hauled or trucked industrial waste except at certain discharge points.
Regarding the vagueness challenge, Iverson argued that a conflict
in the definitions of "pollutant" in the three statutes created vagueness.
However, the court stated that a reasonable person of ordinary
intelligence would understand from reading the statutes that all three
prohibit the discharge of any hauled or trucked industrial waste except
at certain discharge points. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague
merely because it incorporates other provisions by reference. A
reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would consult the
incorporated provisions.
Next, Iverson argued that a corporate officer is "responsible" only
when the officer in fact exercises control over the activity causing the
discharge. However, the CWA holds criminally liable any person who
knowingly violates its provisions. The CWA defines "person" to include
any responsible corporate officer. When Congress' intent of the
statute and the ordinary and common meaning of words are
considered, a person is a "responsible corporate officer" if the person
has authority to exercise control over the corporation's activity causing
the discharges. There is no requirement that the officer in fact
exercise such authority. Additionally, the CWA has a knowledge
requirement. A defendant must know that the substance discharged
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was a pollutant. Here, the defendant's involvement with the prior
discharges tended to prove knowledge and familiarity with the
company's industrial waste. Because Iverson was personally involved
and had authority to exercise control over the illegal discharge of
industrial waste, he was a responsible corporate officer and was
subsequently criminally liable for the company's wastewater disposal
practices.
Eric V Snyder

Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Int'l, 3 F. Supp. 2d 815
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (holding that summary judgment for the defendant
in a suit for contribution for response costs was proper where the
plaintiff could not prove the defendant caused the contamination, and
where the plaintiff based its theory of liability solely on speculation and
possibility).
Plaintiff, Kalamazoo River Study Group ("KRSG"), filed this suit
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA") and the Michigan Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Act ("NREPA"). It also sought
contribution for response costs incurred in response to releases of
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") into the Kalamazoo River. KRSG
filed this suit against eight other companies with facilities on or near
the Kalamazoo River. The issue before the court was defendant
Benteler Industries, Inc.'s ("Benteler") motion for summary judgment.
Based upon studies conducted between 1972 and 1989, the
Michigan Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR") determined
that a three mile portion of Portage Creek, from Cork Street to the
Kalamazoo River, and a thirty-five mile portion of the Kalamazoo
River, from this confluence downstream to the Allegan City Dam (the
"Site"), contained large amounts of PCBs. In 1990, the EPA listed the
Site on the National Priority List as a Superfund site pursuant to
CERCLA, and the MDNR listed the Site as an environmental
contamination site under the Michigan Environmental Response Act.
The MDNR identified three paper companies as potentially
responsible parties as a result of their past recycling operations from
1957-1971.
The recycling operations included the de-inking of
carbonless copy paper, which contained PCBs. James River Paper
Company joined HM Holdings, Inc., Georgia-Pacific Corporation, and
Simpson Plainwell Paper Company to form KRSG, an unincorporated
association. KRSG alleged that the eight other companies contributed
to PCB contamination and sought reimbursement or contribution for
their response costs.
Benteler manufactures automobile parts. Benteler purchased the
Galesburg manufacturing facility at issue in this case in 1986. The

